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Abstract—Reconciliation is an essential part of any secret-key
agreement protocol and hence of a Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD) protocol, where two legitimate parties are given correlated
data and want to agree on a common string in the presence of an
adversary, while revealing a minimum amount of information.
In this paper, we show that for discrete-variable QKD pro-
tocols, this problem can be advantageously solved with Low
Density Parity Check (LDPC) codes optimized for the BSC. In
particular, we demonstrate that our method leads to a significant
improvement of the achievable secret key rate, with respect to
earlier interactive reconciliation methods used in QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a QKD protocol [1], two legitimate parties, Alice and
Bob, aim at sharing an information theoretic secret key, even
in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. In the quantum part of
such a protocol, Alice and Bob exchange quantum signals, e.g.
single photons, which carry classical information. For instance,
Alice encodes a classical bit onto the polarization or the phase
of a photon and sends this photon to Bob who measures it.
After repeating this step n times, Alice and Bob share two
n−bit strings, X and Y . Eve has access to a random variable
Z , possibly correlated to X and Y .
In any realistic implementation of a QKD protocol, X and
Y suffer discrepancies mainly due to losses in the channel
and noise in Bob’s detectors but which are conservatively
attributed to the action of an eavesdropper. Therefore, any
QKD protocol must include a classical post-processing step
in order to extract a secret key from the correlated strings
X and Y . This is done thanks to classical communication
over a noiseless, authenticated but otherwise insecure channel.
This secret key agreement is itself split in two parts. First,
Alice and Bob correct the errors between their strings: this
is the so-called reconciliation phase which concerns us here.
Then, in the privacy amplification phase [2], Alice and Bob
apply a randomly chosen compression function to their mutual
string. If the compression function is well chosen, the result
is uncorrelated with Z and constitutes a secret key.
The theoretical secret capacity Kth is given by:
Kth = H(X |Z)−H(X |Y ). (1)
The precise definition of H(X |Z) depends on the type of
attack considered, whereas H(X |Y ) represents the conditional
(Shannon) entropy of X given Y .
This secret capacity is actually theoretical and is achieved
only in the case of a perfect reconciliation scheme. In partic-
ular, the term H(X |Y ) corresponds to the minimum amount
of classical information that Alice needs to send to Bob to
help him correct his string Y . In a realistic implementation,
the actual secret key rate Kreal is given by:
Kreal = H(X |Z)− fH(X |Y ), (2)
where f is a parameter greater than 1 that characterizes the
reconciliation efficiency.
The main effect of an imperfect reconciliation is clearly
a reduction of the secret key rate, which in turn, limits the
range of the QKD protocol. This is the reason why the
reconciliation should be as efficient as possible. However,
one should keep in mind two other important factors when
evaluating a reconciliation scheme: its complexity and its
rapidity. This last criterium is especially relevant in the case
of highly interactive schemes where latency can become an
issue.
In most QKD protocols, the information is encoded on
binary variables. This is the case we will consider here. Errors
are usually uncorrelated and symmetric. For this reason, X and
Y can be seen, respectively, as the input and the output of a
binary symmetric channel (BSC). In a typical implementation
of a QKD protocol, Alice and Bob have access to the channel
characteristics. In particular, the crossover probability p of the
BSC is supposed known.
To fix ideas, let us consider the most emblematic QKD
protocol: BB84 [3]. For this protocol, the different condi-
tional entropies can be easily expressed as a function of p:
H(X |Z) = 1 − h(p) and H(X |Y ) = h(p) where h(p) =
−p log
2
p− (1− p) log
2
(1− p) is the binary entropy function.
This leads to:
Kreal = 1− (1 + f(p))h(p). (3)
In the following, we will use this expression to compare the ef-
ficiencies of different reconciliation schemes. One should note
that even with a perfect reconciliation scheme, the maximum
bit error rate admissible to distribute a secret is 11%. Typical
implementations have an error rate between 3 and 10 %. This
is this range of parameter that interests us here.
2The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in section II,
we review the Cascade protocol which is currently the solution
adopted in most implementations. In section III, we present
an optimization technique of LDPC codes for the BSC. The
respective performances of Cascade and our LDPC codes are
then discussed in section IV.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
A. The Cascade protocol
Cascade was proposed by Brassard and Salvail in their
seminal paper “Secret key reconciliation by public discussion”
[4] as an alternative to error correcting codes because at the
time their complexity was too high to be used in practice
[5]. Cascade takes benefit from the interaction between Alice
and Bob over an authenticated public channel to simplify
the problem of reconciliation. It can be described by a very
compact and elegant algorithm.
The Cascade protocol is run iteratively a given number
of passes, this number being determined as a function of
the estimated probability of error. This error estimation is
conducted prior to beginning the protocol, on a statistically
significant random sample of Alice and Bob’s data. In each
pass i, Alice and Bob agree on a random permutation σi which
they apply to their strings: X i = σi(X) and Y i = σi(Y ).
Then they divide their permutated strings into blocks of ki bits.
After each pass the block size will be doubled: ki = 2ki−1.
The value of the initial block size k1 is a critical parameter.
An empirical result in [5] indicates that an optimal value is
k1 ≈ 0.73/e, e being the estimated error probability.
For each block j Alice sends its parity xj to Bob while
Bob computes yj , the parity of its block, sends it to Alice,
and compares it with xj . If yj 6= xj Alice and Bob perform
a binary search to find and correct an error in position p. The
binary search consists in splitting the block j into two halves,
and then calculate and exchange the parity of one half. If both
parities do not agree, Alice and Bob continue the binary search
with the same half, if they agree they continue with the other
half.
The position p where an error has been found belonged to
different blocks in the preceding passes. Let C be the set of
such blocks with an odd number of errors. Alice and Bob can
now choose the smallest block in C and perform a binary
search to find and correct another error. This new error will
imply adding or removing blocks from C. This process is
performed until C is emptied.
It should be noted that Cascade is highly interactive even
when carefully implemented. Since many exchanges between
Alice and Bob are required to reconcile a string, the time
overhead for these communications can severely limit the
achievable key generation rate. This could for instance be the
case in free space QKD implemented between a satellite and a
base station and even more when the communication between
Alice and Bob is performed over a network connection with
a high latency.
Despite this limitation, Cascade is certainly the most widely
used reconciliation protocol in practical discrete variables
QKD setups. One of its interests is its relative simplicity
and the fact that it performs reasonably well in terms of
efficiency. As we shall see, most of the alternative solutions
developed after Cascade have focused on reducing the level of
interactivity, usually at the expense of reconciliation efficiency.
This is the reason why we have used Cascade as the essential
element of comparison with the solution we have designed,
that has the double advantage of being non-interactive and of
performing better that Cascade in terms of efficiency over a
wide parameter range.
B. Other work on information reconciliation protocols
Many variations around the principle of interactive recon-
ciliation used in Cascade have been proposed, in order to
limit the interactivity. Relevant work on the optimization of
the block lengths has been done in [6], and allows to limit
the number of rounds in the regime of very low error rate.
Among the most notable works, we can also cite the Winnow
protocol[7]. Like Cascade, Winnow splits the binary strings
to be reconciled into blocks but instead of correcting errors
by iterative binary search, the error correction is based on
the Hamming code. Winnow’s interest lies in the reduction of
the amount of required communication to three messages per
iteration [8]. Winnow is thus significantly faster that Cascade
but unfortunately, its efficiency is lower for error rates below
10 %, i.e. in the parameter range useful for practical QKD.
Another interesting development has been conducted by Liu[9]
who has proposed a protocol that optimizes the information
exchanged per corrected bit. Liu’s protocol is in essence very
similar to Cascade. Its objective is to minimize the information
sent on the public channel to correct one error during a pass
and leads to better efficiency. This protocol however remains
highly interactive.
Some QKD protocols provide Alice and Bob with corre-
lated continuous random variables and specific work on key
reconciliation has been conducted in this context, beginning
with the work on Sliced Error Correction [10] used to convert
continuous variables into binary strings. It is also mainly in the
context of continuous variables that modern coding techniques
have been used within information reconciliation protocols:
turbo codes in [8] and LDPC codes in [11], [12].
In contrast with continous-variable information reconcil-
iation, not much has been done to adapt modern coding
techniques to the discrete case. Forward error correction has
the advantage of being very well known and even attaining
the Shannon limit for some channels. Also, and of great
importance for QKD, it requires a single message, namely
the syndrome of X for the code being used, to correct the
discrepancies. Relevant references are BBN Niagara [13] and
the work for free space QKD by Duligall et al. [14] both
of which use LDPC codes. However [13] provides a single
point comparing the performance of LDPC codes and Cascade,
showing a major decrease of the communication overhead but
a slightly decrease in the efficiency while [14] does not provide
any information on the results of their use of LDPC codes.
III. OPTIMIZATION OF LDPC CODES FOR THE BSC
LDPC codes also known as Gallager codes are linear codes
that have a sparse parity check matrix, that is with relatively
3TABLE I
THRESHOLDS AND DEGREE DISTRIBUTIONS FOUND FOR A REPRESENTATIVE SET OF RATES
Code rate Threshold λ(x) & ρ(x)
0.90 0.0109 λ(x) = 0.07689x+ 0.28096x2 + 0.08933x4 + 0.19620x8 + 0.30631x11 + 0.05031x20
ρ(x) = 0.95025x49 + 0.04975x50
0.85 0.0199 λ(x) = 0.04528x+ 0.20537x2 + 0.05878x3 + 0.094274x4 + 0.08454x5 + 0.01176x6 + 0.05137x8 + 0.50015x20
ρ(x) = 0.54204x40 + 0.45795x41
0.80 0.0298 λ(x) = 0.09420x+ 0.18088x2 + 0.11972x5 + 0.08550x6 + 0.09816x7 + 0.07194x16 + 0.34960x25
ρ(x) = 0.58807x28 + 0.4119329
0.75 0.0392 λ(x) = 0.10805x+ 0.09511x2 + 0.01449x3 + 0.13764x4 + 0.10667x5 + 0.05288x6 + 0.01107x27 + 0.47408x30
ρ(x) = 0.74161x24 + 0.2583925
0.70 0.0504 λ(x) = 0.05343x+ 0.29406x2 + 0.00896x5 + 0.15571x8 + 0.12189x11 + 0.19872x24 + 0.09572x45 + 0.02741x61
+0.04056x64 + 0.00354x72
ρ(x) = 0.76922x19 + 0.2307720
0.65 0.0633 λ(x) = 0.10451x+ 0.15652x2 + 0.08057x3 + 0.00056x4 + 0.12151x8 + 0.10485x12 + 0.10719x14 + 0.00771x20
+0.31656x50
ρ(x) = 0.000578x + 0.06089x14 + 0.47001x15 + 0.46852x20
0.60 0.0766 λ(x) = 0.11040x+ 0.20804x2 + 0.14163x7 + 0.14858x8 + 0.14438x25 + 0.08909x26 + 0.00748x45 + 0.15038x70
ρ(x) = 0.00036x+ 0.13063x9 + 0.31068x12 + 0.49341x17 + 0.064915x18
0.55 0.0904 λ(x) = 0.16880x+ 0.20994x2 + 0.18095x5 + 0.03846x14 + 0.02635x15 + 0.23454x17 + 0.05815x18 + .08280x30
ρ(x) = 0.27631x9 + 0.7236910
0.50 0.1071 λ(x) = 0.14438x+ 0.19026x2 + 0.01836x3 + 0.00233x4 + 0.04697x5 + 0.053943x7 + 0.05590x8 + 0.01290x9
+0.00162x10 + 0.06159x13 + 0.13115x14 + 0.01481x16 + 0.00879x46 + 0.00650x48 + 0.00210x54 + 0.00099x55
+0.11178x56 + 0.06238x57 + 0.05094x58 + 0.02230x65
ρ(x) = 0.47575x9 + 0.46847x11 + 0.02952x12 + 0.02626x13
few non zero values.
Their main advantage is that they can perform very close
to Shannon limit, even with a suboptimal but fast, iterative
decoding scheme.
In the case of reconciliation of binary strings, and hence for
application to discrete-variable QKD, LDPC codes need to be
specifically optimized for the BSC.
The LDPC code design optimization problem can be effi-
ciently addressed with a genetic algorithm; Differential Evo-
lution (DE) [15]. In particular, this solution was successfully
applied for the BEC in [16] and for the BIAWGN channel in
[17].
DE is an Evolutionary Optimization Algorithm, it maintains
a population of N D−dimensional vectors (code candidates)
of real parameters respecting some constraints. This population
evolves for a fixed number of generations or until a vector
is found which meets a stopping criterion. The population is
initialized to cover as much as possible of the parameter space.
For each generation, DE mutates and recombines the current
population to produce a trial population. Mutation is performed
by adding the weighted difference of two population vectors
to a third one.
Recombination is used to increase the diversity of the trial
population: trial vectors are modified incorporating a small set
of parameter values from a current population vector. A trial
vector is incorporated into the current population if a cost
function assigns to it a lower cost value than the cost value of
the preceding vector, otherwise it is discarded.
LDPC codes can be represented as bipartite graphs [18].
One set of nodes, the check nodes, represents the set of parity-
check equations which define the code; the other, the variable
nodes, represents the elements of the codewords. A check
(variable) node in the graph is called of degree i if it is
connected to i variable (check) nodes. We denote by λi (ρi)
the fraction of edges which are connected to bit (check) nodes
of degree i. Let L be the maximum variable degree and R
the maximum check degree, we define an ensemble of LDPC
codes by the generating functions λ(x) and ρ(x).
λ(x) :=
∑L
i=2 λix
i−1 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1
ρ(x) :=
∑R
i=2 ρix
i−1 0 ≤ ρi ≤ 1
(4)
We can express the code rate as a function of the coefficients
of λ(x) and ρ(x):
Rate = 1−
∑R
i=2 ρi/i∑L
i=2 λi/i
(5)
The functions λ(x) and ρ(x) have L+R− 2 non zero co-
efficients. However not all these coefficients are independent:
λ(x) and ρ(x) define degree distributions and must therefore
be normalized, and we want all codes to be of the same rate
in order to compare their thresholds.
In particular, to ensure that λ(x) and ρ(x) define a degree
distribution we fix the coefficients corresponding to variable
and check nodes of degree 2:
λ2 = 1−
L∑
i=3
λi, ρ2 = 1−
R∑
i=3
ρi (6)
4We can set the code rate using a third coefficient, we use
λL. From (5) and (6), one gets:
λL =
1−β
2
+
∑R
i=3 ρi(
1
i
− 1
2
)− β
∑L−1
i=3 λi(
1
i
− 1
2
)
β( 1
L
− 1
2
)
(7)
where β = 1− Rate.
These three constraints leave a final number of D = L +
R−5 parameters each one associated with one of the non fixed
coefficients of λ(x) and ρ(x). Finally we require the codes to
be stable for crossover probabilities p below their threshold,
the stability condition for the BSC channel being given by
[17]:
λ2 ≤
1
2
∑
i(i− 1)ρi
√
p(1− p)
(8)
We have used discretized density evolution algorithm [19]
to compute the cost function and evaluate the candidate codes.
This algorithm calculates a threshold value for a random
LDPC code with a fixed node and degree distribution. The
threshold determines the limit of the error-free region asymp-
totically as the block length tends to infinity. Discretized
density evolution guarantees that the predicted threshold is a
lower bound of the real threshold.
The results we have obtained with this set of constraints are
shown in Table I. For all rates the thresholds are very close
to the Shannon limit. These thresholds are only achievable by
infinite length codes, but experimental results obtained with
finite length codes were not very different (see section IV-A).
This is indeed not too surprising since the relevant length of
codes we have used is quite large (106), adapted to the typical
requirements of QKD where large blocks of data have to be
processed together to minimize finite size effects [20].
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we discuss the experimental performances
of Cascade and of our LDPC codes for block length of 106.
We have implemented Cascade as described in [5] and our
LDPC codes are decoded with the belief propagation algorithm
[21]. The remaining bit error probability is below 1.5 · 10−6
and the remaining errors can be handled very efficiently by
concatenation with a BCH code of very high rate (typically
0.998 [22]).
A. Reconciliation Efficiency
As explained in Section I the performance of a reconcilia-
tion protocol can be evaluated by measuring the amount of
information disclosed in this process. For the BSC with a
crossover probability p, an ideal reconciliation protocol would
reveal a fraction h(p) while a real protocol reveals f(p)h(p).
We have represented the reconciliation efficiency f(p) on Fig.
1 for Cascade and for our codes. The results that we have
found with Cascade are very similar to those of Crepeau [5]
or Brassard and Salvail [4]: Cascade performs well at low bit
error rates where its efficiency differs only by 10% from the
Shannon limit of 1. However, its efficiency decreases gradually
as the crossover probability increases.
A quick observation reveals that, in contrast with Cascade,
the reconciliation efficiency f(p) exhibits a saw behavior when
our set of LDPC codes is used. The reason for this is that we
have chosen a discrete number of codes. As each code has a
certain threshold, a string with a measured error probability p
will be corrected with the code having the smallest threshold
greater than p. The saw effect will be reduced as the number
of LDPC codes used is increased. To illustrate this fact, we
have also included in Fig.1 the smooth curve which would be
the result of using an infinite number of LDPC codes.
As we can see on this figure, optimized LDPC codes can
perform better than Cascade as soon as the error rate is above
2%. With our set of 9 LDPC codes, the performances are
always better than Cascade when the error rate is above 5%.
This gain of performance can significantly impact on the
achievable secret key generation rate in practical QKD.
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Fig. 1. Reconciliation Efficiency f(p) achieved by LDPC codes and Cascade.
(1) Using our set of 9 LDPC codes described in Table I (2) Extrapolated curve
of f(p) for an infinite number of LDPC codes.
B. Secret Key Rate and Local Randomization
As it appears from Eq. (3), the measure of the reconciliation
efficiency f(p) can be translated into a value of the achievable
secret key rate Kreal(p), value that is indeed the true figure
of merit for a practical QKD system.
In order to mitigate the saw effect produced by using a
LDPC code non-adapted to the error-rate of the BSC, we
have studied the impact of a possible improvement that can
easily be implemented in practice: local randomization [23].
The idea is to make use of the LDPC codes in a error rate
region close to their threshold, where their efficiency f(p)
is better. To achieve that in practice we use our freedom
to worsen the error rate before performing the information
reconciliation, by performing a local randomization on X , the
string held by Alice. When the error rate p is in the range
p ∈ (a, b) corresponding to the region of use of a given
LDPC code of threshold b, we worsen the error rate from
p to b. To do that, Alice can flip each of her bits with a
probability e. In order to have final error rate of b we must take
e = b−p
1−2p
. From the point of view of Alice and Bob, the chain
5X is replaced by a chain X ′ and the practical reconciliation
reveals a fraction fH(X ′ |Y ) = f(b)h(b). From the point
of view of Eve, the effect of local randomization is however
worse: Eve holds Z , a noisy version of Alice’s chain with
H(X |Z) = 1− h(p) = h(q). Alice then flips each of her bits
with probability e and the effective error probability for Eve
is e(1 − q) + (1 − e)q = q + e − 2eq. Applying Eq. (1) with
X
′
replacing X leads to:
Klr(p) = h(q + e− 2eq)− f(b)h(b) (9)
The comparison of what can be achieved using either Cas-
cade or our LDPC codes is displayed on Fig. 2. The advantage
of our reconciliation protocol can be well understood by
considering the maximal admissible bit error rate. While it
is less than 9.5 % with Cascade, it becomes very close the
theoretical limit of 11 % with our protocol. This implies in
practice that the maximum distance at which practical secure
secret key distribution is possible will be extended when using
our reconciliation protocol.
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Fig. 2. Secret Key Rate for Cascade and LDPC codes. (1) Theoretical limit,
(2) LDPC codes with local randomization , (3) LDPC codes without local
randomization , (4) Cascade (n=100000)
V. CONCLUSION
We have shown that LDPC codes can be used to reconcile
two correlated discrete random variables. The results show
that LDPC codes are a good alternative to Cascade. In terms
of reconciliation efficacity they offer a similar behaviour for
small crossover probabilities and a significant improvement
for the crossover probabilities over 0.02. In terms of the
interactivity LDPC codes need a single information exchange
to reconcile the two variables while Cascade is very greedy in
communication resources.
LDPC codes have been optimized for the BSC with thresh-
olds near the channel capacity. This result can have a prac-
tical impact on the performance of QKD systems but also
find a broader range of application to other scenarios where
information-theoretic secret key agreement can be performed,
such as the wiretap channel [24] or Maurer’s satellite scenario
[25].
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